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Notes on Amartya Sen’s interpretation of cultural identity – Part 3

da , | 2 Ott, 24 | Filosofia |

5) Pluralities

Sen argues that classifying people according to few rigid criteria cannot do justice to the diversity of people. The individuals are much more different from each other than any classification can show:

“The politics of global confrontation is frequently seen as a corollary of religious or cultural divisions in the world. Indeed, the world is increasingly seen, if only implicitly, as a federation of religions or of civilizations, thereby ignoring all the other ways in which people see themselves. Underlying this line of thinking is the odd presumption that the people of the world can be uniquely categorized according to some singular and overarching system of partitioning. Civilizational or religious partitioning of the world population yields a “solitarist” approach to human identity, which sees human beings as members of exactly one group (in this case defined by civilization or religion, in contrast with earlier reliance on nationalities and classes).”
–Amartya Sen, (2006), Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny, p. xii

Sen denies that the world (or a state) can be viewed as a composite of religions, civilisations, or communities[1]. The components of society are the individuals, who cannot be reduced to their belonging to this or that group. The individual constitutes an irreducible entity: therefore, individuals cannot be reduced to something else which is superior to them. The basis of society is and remains the individual. The individual is essentially irreducible to other entities or to other systems.
Those who divide and classify individuals on the basis of rigid criteria assume that an individual can be referred to a single culture and to a single group. Identity is interpreted, within this view, as something absolute. In Sen’s view, classifying a person under only one category is misleading since an individual possesses a plurality of components. Identity is not something monolithic. The cultural identity of a person always consists in a plurality of elements:

“A solitarist approach can be a good way of misunderstanding nearly everyone in the world. In our normal lives, we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups – we belong to all of them.”
–Amartya Sen, (2006), Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny, p. xii

The notion that there is a single identity for the individual does not give a trustworthy picture of the individual: the nature of individuals does not correspond to the image which those who plead for the concept of the monodimensional identity give of the individuals. The authentic nature of the individual does not correspond to the interpretation which the solitarist interpretation gives of him.


[1] See Sen’s critique of Huntington’s theses in Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny, pp. 40–43, 46–50, 106–108.

Every individual is always a plurality: all individuals possess a plurality of cultural elements. The relevance of elements of cultural identities varies depending on the way of life and on the interests of the individuals. The value of an element of a specific cultural identity depends on the context in which the individual lives or on the interest which the individual purses in his life: consequently, it should be born in mind that the weight of every element belonging to specific cultural identity changes or can change.

  • On the one hand, the cultural identity consists of a multiplicity of cultural identities.
  • On the other hand, every element of the cultural identity does not occupy a definitively determined position in relation to all the other elements. The relevance of an element of a cultural identity can vary depending on the life circumstances and on the individual’s interests.

Those who plead for the flexible conception of identity will interpret identities as dynamic systems. They know that every cultural identity is the result of a process of unification between different components; they are aware that every cultural identity is the result of historical developments. They know that every cultural identity is not given once and for all, but it has changed, it changes and will change. Any cultural identity is an entity which has an evolution: therefore, it is not static, and it is not given once and for all. Cultural identities are not complete systems: they come about as the result of a process. They are always in a process. Cultural identities are always a work in progress.

Cultural identities are not absolute systems because, among other things, they are always the result of other preceding cultural forms: they arise from preceding cultures and always have close connections with other cultural forms. The absolutely original content does not exist. Identity is a dynamic system: it is evolving, changing, and developing [2]. The concept on the basis of which a single classification scheme exists is, in Sen’s opinion, inherently wrong. It is not relevant whether the classification scheme is based on religion, community, culture, nation, or civilisation. Human beings cannot be classified according to a single criterion since human beings have a plurality of cultural components.


[2] Sen points out in his investigation that within this interpretation, cultural identity is seen as a system to be discovered and correspondingly not to be chosen; the aim of presenting cultural identity as a phenomenon to be discovered is to contend that the cultural identity is a system which is already given independently of the actions, the choices, the thought of the individual. In this view, individuals are subjected to their cultural identities. The individual discovers an entity which has been made without his contribution. Cultural identity is not modifiable. The individual cannot go out of that identity: a person cannot step out of his nature. Identity is considered, within this perspective, as a natural phenomenon, not as a historical phenomenon which, since it is historical, has a development.

6) Sen’s criticism of communitarian and multiculturalist positions

Sen criticises the communitarian positions too as the following passage can attest:

“Many communitarian thinkers tend to argue that a dominant communal identity is only a matter of self-realization, not of choice. It is, however, hard to believe that a person really has no choice in deciding what relative importance to attach to the various groups to which he or she belongs, and that she must just “discover” her identities, as if were a purely natural phenomenon (like determining whether it is day or night). In fact, we are all constantly making choices, if only implicitly, about the priorities to be attached to our different affiliations and associations. The freedom to determine our loyalties and priorities between the different groups to all of which we may belong is a peculiarly important liberty which we have reason to recognize, value, and defend.”
–Amartya Sen, (2006), Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny, p. 5

Sen’s opposition to communitarian thinking comes out clearly in this context. According to Sen, communitarians hold the following views:

  • There is a dominant identity; there is one and only one identity and not a plurality of identities.
  • The individual recognises that a dominant identity exists and that he belongs to that identity. The individual plays only a secondary role if he is compared with the cultural identity and the group. Group and cultural identity, not the individual, are the centre of the society.
  • The impression which the reader receives from the description of the communitarian positions is that communitarians see the individual as something to be dissolved into an entity which transcends him [3].
  • Communitarians interpret the kind of relationship of the individual with his identity as a matter of discovery, of recognition, and not of free choice. In this interpretation of identity, the individual can only accept his identity. The individual cannot distance himself from his cultural identity: the identity constitutes his very nature.

Sen believes that any form of identity is never something whose content has been determined once and for all. The individual is not possessed by any cultural identity, or at least the individual is in the condition of not being possessed by any cultural identity if he chooses not to become the property of any cultural identity. The responsibility of the individual may never be excluded as regards the kind of relation which the individual has with his cultural identity: it is a matter of the individual’s choice and responsibility whether the individual absolutises his cultural identity or whether he relativises it.

The communitarians see the individual as submitted to his cultural identity, i.e., as a property of the identity. The individual is the property of his cultural identity. Identity is the constitutive cultural nature of the individual: consequently, the individual cannot be detached from his culture. The individual is one thing with his culture, i.e., the individual is nothing without his culture (the individual does not exist without his culture at the psychological, mental, and behavioural levels). Against this conception, Sen interprets the individual as a free being which can distance itself from its cultural identity.

Sen gives value to the capacity for self-determination which communitarians do not recognise. Communitarians do not think that the individual can determine himself against his cultural identity. The choice of the individual is the decisive aspect for Sen: the individual can always be free from his cultural identity if the individual is ready to use his capacity for self-determination.

In Sen’s view, the multiculturalism of the parallel communities is, on closer inspection, a form of plural monoculturalism in which the individuals are prisoners of the traditions of their community.

The presence of different cultures in a country is necessary, but not sufficient, to have a multicultural society. For Sen, multiculturalism as such presupposes and requires exchanges between cultures. In an authentic multicultural society, cultures are not islands: there are relationships, exchanges, and communications between groups.


[3] Sen defends the primacy of the individual beyond any form of affiliation. The individual comes first; identities follow. No entity transcends the individual. The individual cannot be reduced to something else; the individual does not dissolve in a superior organism.

7) Conclusions

Sen’s intent consists in showing that identity can have different senses; his aim consists in showing that identity is not something original, given once and for all. Identity is a result of a process and will change through new processes. Identity is a composition of elements. Individuals do not belong to something absolute since this absolute does not exist. Individuals are all differently different: there are no groups in which individuals are at the same time all identical to each other and different from the individuals not belonging to them. Sen’s text is a demystification of the manipulations of individuals through the concept of culture and of identity as something which absorbs individuals and excludes others.

The different interpretations of identities imply different models for society: a society of rigid identities and a society of flexible identities bring about different societies since they plead for and produce different kinds of groups. Societies will be different depending on the interpretations of cultural identity, there will be different societies. The society of the flexible identity will be inclusive; the society of the rigid identity, on the contrary, will be a marginalising society.

The monodimensional interpretation of identity is an operation for the enslavement of the individual in a cultural component. Sen argues for the presence of different identities within an individual and for the contacts between groups: his starting point is never the group. The starting point is the individual who is an irreducible entity. Sen shows that cultural identities are often determined on the basis of an arbitrary way of proceeding: a specific component of an individual is privileged to the disadvantage of other components.

A society of flexible identity has different groups present in itself and is open to the presence of different groups. Individuals can be members of groups, but they are not the property of the groups. They acknowledge that any culture whatsoever is the result of different components; they acknowledge that cultures have a steady development. They can and are ready to recognise that their identity is something which has had changes, is changing – even though the individual is not aware of the changes – and will change. There are no definitive results as regards cultural identities.

Every individual consists of numerous identities: therefore, the cultural identity of every human being is to be understood as a system of cultural identities. To sum up the results of our investigation:

  • There is not only one identity; each identity arises from different identities.
  • Each person has many components: persons bring within themselves a plurality of identities and of cultures; they cannot be reduced to one and only one identity.
  • The absolutisation of cultural identity serves the purpose of uniting the group characterised by this same identity, separating the group from other groups, and excluding all those who do not belong to the specific group from the group. Rigid cultural identity divides. This kind of cultural identity is built in order that it could divide. Those who interpret the identity in such a way interpret identity in this way since they want to divide the groups from each other. They want to reach the uniformity of the group and the exclusion of all those who do not belong to the group.
  • The absolutisation of a cultural identity constitutes a straitjacket for every individual.
  • The assertion that everyone has one and only one identity serves to exclude the others. It has an immediate potential for violence.
  • The absolutisation of identity should be countered by the notion that everyone has many components, that the identity of every individual is both something made up of many components and something that is not still but constantly evolving.
  • The responsibility for one’s identity, and thus also for the possible absolutisation of a single aspect, is always born by the individual. Every individual can decide to which component he gives greater importance. The individual has the free choice and the responsibility for his choice.
  • The primacy ought to belong to the individual; communities and groups deserve due consideration; nevertheless, the state is not a federation of communities or groups: the state consists of individuals.

References

Huntington, S.P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Sen, A. 1981. Poverty and Famines. An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Sen, A. 2004. How does culture matter?, in: Culture and Public Action, edited by Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 37–58.
Sen, A. 2006. Identity and Violence. The Illusion of Destiny. New York, London: Norton.
Sen, A. 2009. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Autori: Kathrin Bouvot – Gianluigi Segalerba

Autori

  • Bouvot Kathrin

    Kathrin Bouvot ha studiato Filosofia, Filologia Romanza e Psicologia all’Università di Vienna. I suoi interessi di ricerca riguardano l'etica sociale e politica, l'estetica e la filosofia di Friedrich Nietzsche. Le sue pubblicazioni più recenti sono: - Kathrin Bouvot, Das Ringen zwischen Erinnern und Vergessen. Über die Suche nach einer Umgangsweise mit der Geschichte, die eine Dienerin des Lebens sein kann., in: Renate Reschke (Hg.), Nietzscheforschung. » … So erzähle ich mir mein Leben. « Über den Zusammenhang von Biographie, Philosophie und Literatur bei Nietzsche. Band 25, Heft 1, im Auftrag der Nietzsche- Gesellschaft e.V. Walter de Gruyter: Berlin/ Boston 2018, p.343 – p.367. - Kathrin Bouvot, Demaskierung von Wahrheiten. Nietzsches Kriegserklärung an den “Götzendienst”. In: Nietzscheforschung »In Ketten tanzen«. Nietzsche über freie und unfreie Geister. Band 26. Herausgegeben von Friederike Felicitas Günther und Enrico Müller. Im Auftrag der Nietzsche- Gesellschaft e.V. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter 2019. p.323 – p.346.

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  • Segalerba Gianluigi

    Gianluigi Segalerba (1967), si è laureato in Filosofia presso l'Università di Pisa nel 1991. Ha conseguito il dottorato di ricerca in Filosofia presso l'Università di Pisa nel 1998. È stato visiting scholar presso le Università di Tubinga, Berna e Vienna. Ha insegnato all'Istituto di Filosofia dell'Università di Vienna. È autore del libro Note su Ousia (Pisa 2001). È stato coeditore del volume Substantia – Sic et Non (Francoforte sul Meno 2008), ed è autore del libro Semantik und Ontologie: Drei Studien zu Aristoteles (Berna 2013). È membro dell'Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos – IEF –, Faculdade de Letras, Universidade de Coimbra. gianluigisegalerba@gmail.com

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